This essay was originally written as part of my engineering degree coursework.
0. Abstract
Delta is a Ukrainian situational awareness system and information sharing platform that has seen extensive operational use following the Russian full-scale invasion. It was rapidly built in response to front-line need and takes advantage of innovations in civilian communication and data technologies. First, we look at the context which allowed Delta to emerge and the motivation behind its creation. Its development as an example of open innovation is examined, along with its role as a platform technology for further digital innovation. Analysis is then presented for Delta’s impact on Ukrainian operational ability. Finally, we look at the wider consequences of its success for the European defence industry.
1. Introduction
Defence has always been a key driver of innovation. From the development of machine tools to component standardisation, many fundamental technologies were conceived to facilitate warfare. DARPA, the United States’ ubiquitous military research organisation has been described as “the agency that shaped the modern world” (The Economist, 2021) for its 20th century contributions to vaccines, the internet and numerous other inventions. While the post-Cold War decades have in some ways deviated from this norm, with civilian sectors leading technological progress (Reuven, 2023), global instability and the active conflict in Ukraine make defence innovation increasingly relevant.
Wartime provides a unique context for such innovation to take place. During a conflict, “militaries must balance the incentive to innovate against the daily need to defeat an enemy” (Jones, McCabe & Palmer, 2023). Time and resource pressures are heightened, but the organisational and motivational barriers to change may be lessened. The war in Ukraine has proved fertile ground for digital innovation, as tools are built out of necessity and tested in live combat. Unlike historic military innovation pipelines, based around centrally planned ‘top-down’ schemes, much of Ukraine’s digital technologies have been developed by private citizens and companies under an ‘open-innovation’ model, where key technologies from the civilian sector are utilised in military applications (Reuven, 2023).
One such tool, Delta, has grown into a critical situational awareness platform that provides real-time support to Ukrainian soldiers on the ground. It does this by providing an information sharing platform for a range of data sources to communicate movements on the battlefield. Delta was pioneered by Aerorozvidka, a volunteer group of drone and tech enthusiasts aiming to provide aerial reconnaissance following the Russian incursion in the Donbas (Soesanto, 2024). The system has been rapidly deployed and now provides a suite of capabilities from secure messaging to GIS mapping. This essay will analyse how Delta, along with advances in communication and data management technologies, have changed the nature of warfighting and defence development more broadly.
2. Information sharing problems
In wartime, information sharing between parties is critical for operational capability. Military communication has developed as a field of its own, with a wide array of complex procedures and systems to maximise information advantage in the ‘fog of war’. Early engagements in Ukraine were hampered by communication difficulties for both Ukrainian and Russian troops. On the day of the full-scale Russian invasion, the ViaSat network, Ukraine’s premier internet satellite communication link, was taken down by hackers and telecom infrastructure suffered heavy shelling (Soesanto, 2024). Reports also emerged of Russian soldiers resorting to the use of unencrypted radio and mobile phones to coordinate movements (Cranny-Evans and Withington, 2022).
Civilian innovation in communications has changed the way we work and live, with software suites providing integrated messaging, navigation and video calling functionality between individuals, corporations and government. Backed by huge userbases and immense capital investment, device costs have been driven down and rapid technological advancement achieved. The Internet of Things (IoT) and inexpensive cameras mean more data is available than ever, all remotely accessible. Transfer of these technologies to military applications has been slower, with limited specialised tools available to process and disseminate a newly available abundance of data. The closest Western example could be the US’ ‘Joint All-Domain Command and Control’ (JADC2) system, aiming to be a ‘network of networks’ that harmonises communication channels between all branches of military. Unfortunately, this system is not yet deployed (Bondar, 2024a).
Widespread use of reconnaissance drones has provided further challenge and opportunity. Realtime knowledge about enemy position and movements is invaluable in the hands of those that need it, but geographically and hierarchically fragmented data collection means traditional communication channels are unsuitable. The development of Delta was driven by the need to harmonise multimodal data streams in a single platform, and present relevant information in real-time.
3. Delta as a situational awareness system
Faced with a perceived lack of preparedness following Russia’s 2014 incursion in the Donbas, Aerorozvidka was formed as a volunteer NGO of military personnel and technical specialists attempting to improve Ukraine’s situational awareness with aerial reconnaissance. This began with a focus on drone deployment, initially with civilian hardware and then quickly iterating to a custom flight platform. At the time the Ukrainian Armed Forces had no drone capability (Soesanto, 2024). Aerorozvidka was primarily privately financed by NGOs and individuals, adopting the flat hierarchy and culture of a startup. Its first employees were recruited through Facebook, and it remained agile in its operations: shifting from drones to high-rise mounted cameras following the destruction of its fleet at the second battle for the Donetsk Airport (ibid.).
It was within this innovative context that the Delta platform was developed. Responding to the need presented by inadequate military communication infrastructure, a NATO trust fund was established in 2014 to improve Ukraine’s communication, command and control, and computing systems (C4). The aim was to move Ukrainian communication towards a culture of information sharing and driven by the vision that small, directed funding could have outsized impact in the right environment (NATO, 2016). In part thanks to this support, Aerorozvidka built the first Delta prototype based around a real-time map to visualise battlefield movements-“imagine Google Maps, but instead of streets and cafes, it shows enemy trenches and tanks” (Halilov, 2024). The goal is ‘joint communications’; an enemy sighting by a drone reconnaissance team could be shared and immediately responded to by a forward infantry patrol. Data submission was both manual, by individuals, and automatic based on the network of cameras Aerorozvidka had deployed across combat zones.
Hackathons, more often associated with Silicon Valley tech startups than defence products, played an instrumental role in this development, with the platform winning NATO’s TIDE event held in 2017. It was deployed in the field the same year and saw early organic growth, with grassroots adoption by military commanders who recognised the case for its use. Network effects took hold with an increasing number of personnel and data sources active on the system. Delta’s foreign cloud-based hosting (Bondar, 2024a) maximised access to the platform and reduced the risk of a Russian attack causing downtime; it also meant any smartphone or laptop could connect, eliminating the need for specialised hardware. NATO officials observed that Delta’s broad accessibility allowed battlefield decisions to be made “even faster than some more modern militaries” (Jakes, 2022).
Because Delta benefits from wide participation, implementing the right authentication scheme was a challenge. Eventually a system of person verification similar to many civilian applications was adopted; in addition to being referred by an authenticated user, personnel must submit a photo of themselves and a passport for review (Soesanto, 2024). Additional two factor authentication (2FA) is currently being rolled out with physical YubiKey devices, a further example of Delta harnessing civilian technology for military use. A permission system allows users only to access sources of information relevant to them and limits the impact of bad actors (Halilov, 2024).
4. Delta as a digital innovation platform
The prevailing benefit of Delta has proved to be its flexibility. As additional needs were identified by users, they were integrated into the software, from operation planning capability to secure messaging. The real-time map remained at the core of the platform, forming the matrix linking together various functionalities with geographic visualisation. Newly developed apps weren’t just ‘bolt-ons’, but actively contributed to Delta’s ‘national data lake’ with entirely new data sources (Allied Command Transformation, 2024). One example is Zvook, a Lviv-based startup deploying acoustic detection systems for drones in built up areas. Through real-time networking, Zvook’s data can appear on the Delta map just 12 seconds after detection (Lishchuk, 2024) for immediate engagement by anti-drone units. Aerorozvidka were even able to tap into NATO’s technical expertise allowing Delta interoperability with allied software platforms, notably the Polish TOPAZ artillery fire control system (Militarnyi, 2024). Lt Cl Yelyzaveta Boiko summarises: “We actually call it ‘Google for military’ […] Google helps to organize your workspace, DELTA helps to organize your ‘war’ space” (Allied Command Transformation, 2024).
Another key feature integrated into Delta’s platform is civilian information analysis, both from social media and submitted sources. Since the beginning of the conflict, a huge amount of information on combatant activity has been shared publicly; functionality to identify relevant posts and geolocate them on Delta was put in place. Complementing this web scraping system, the eEnemy platform was developed to allow civilian informants to submit information they deem significant for dissemination through the Delta (Soesanto, 2024). This crowdsourced intelligence has raised ethical concerns, as it necessarily blurs the line between civilians and military informants, an important distinction under humanitarian law.
Delta developers and users were motivationally aligned in their overall mission of defeating the enemy, reducing resistance to change and creating an environment where iterative innovation was encouraged. Feedback mechanisms between these groups, along with an agile approach to product management, ensured the platform being built was the one military personnel wanted. This alignment extended beyond Aerorozvidka, with the group taking advantage of open innovation globally and partnering with firms like Zvook to maximise platform usefulness. Delta’s successful uptake amongst frontline troops made it a platform where people wanted to build new things, knowing the potential for real reach and impact.
5. Transformative effects of the Delta system
The full-scale Russian invasion and subsequent defence of Kyiv led to rapid growth of Delta users and boosted awareness of the platform. With the Russian convoy approaching the city, Delta was used to identify at least 1500 targets daily and led to the elimination of hundreds (Jakes, 2022). Recognising the critical role it played in this operation, in 2023 Ukrainian military decided to absorb the software into its newly created Centre of Innovations and Defence Technologies Development before officially rolling it out to all units (Bondar, 2024a). While this move may allow better digital standardisation across the Ukrainian forces, there are concerns that government bureaucracy could frustrate Delta’s ability to adapt as new operational needs are identified.
There is ongoing debate as to how transformative the Delta platform and other recent digital data management innovations have been to combat operations. The conflict in Ukraine is one torn between eras, with Soviet artillery rolled out to target threats identified by video feed. Despite serious change in available digital technology, familiar patterns of warfare have emerged, with trenches dug and territory taken in human wave attacks. The CSIS (Jones, McCabe & Palmer, 2023) argue that the situation has developed into a war of attrition and any outcome will be determined by destruction of matériel and personnel. They do however recognise Ukraine’s innovation advantage, suggesting that digital innovation has played a role in opposing Russian attack thus far and concluding “innovation may grow even more important as the war grinds on”. Widespread UAV deployment is one truly disruptive combat innovation and is necessarily supported by progress in communications.
Asymmetry between intelligence capability and firepower remains a problem: while Ukrainian reconnaissance drones might be able to identify a dug in pair of enemy troops, soldiers may lack an economical way to engage them. With static warfare, intelligence on enemy movements can be less instrumental.
What the delta system has achieved is a NATO compliant and battle tested model for network centric warfare, developed before any other western military. Truly integrated communications and data sharing, as envisioned in JADC2, has been realised-not with a centralised command structure, but using a necessity driven bottom-up approach. This organic growth of Delta was one of its biggest strengths, forcing developers to respond quickly to user needs and focus on issues that matter.
6. Delta as a bellwether for open innovation
The achievement of Delta isn’t just limited to the battlefield but represents a transformative shift in how digital innovation can take place in the defence sector. The technologies Delta implements are not revolutionary, critically though they addressed user needs in a time pressured environment. The success of the platform shows open innovation and startup organisation have the potential to seriously disrupt a ‘lumbering military industrial complex’, as they have done in the civilian tech sector (Lipton, 2023). The streamlining of bureaucracy as a consequence of the Russian invasion allowed for tools like Delta to thrive and model a different route for defence procurement in peacetime. NATO and national governments are now directing funding to incubators and investment funds aiming to address future national security challenges (Guest, 2024).
Traditionally approached with hesitancy by VCs, the Ukraine war has led to a sea change in European inward defence tech investment, with a threefold increase on investment in 2024 compared to previous years (Pfeifer, 2024). Concerns over the ethics of supporting military technology have had to confront the reality of war in Europe, with historic blanket avoidance no longer seen as tenable. US funds provided more than 65% of this VC with much of it directed to startups building information systems and AI tools. In a sector once dominated by government research institutes and contracts, the role of private capital is notable. State backing still plays a part however with US aid supporting a large number of these startups: the prospect of a second Trump administration and the potential for a dramatic cut in this funding channel could spell trouble for these businesses going forward.
7. Conclusion
Developments in communication technology and data management have changed and will continue to change how warfighting is carried out, with the impact of innovation already evident in platforms like Delta. As tools mature and militaries develop strategies around new capabilities, they are likely to become ever more critical in field operations. Information advantage has always been an important part of war, but the challenge now is an abundance of information, not a lack of it. Ukraine demonstrates that these developments can be harnessed even without established military communications infrastructure. The challenges presented by asymmetric threats and the economics of attrition warfare mean intelligence will remain critical to Ukrainian operations.
Delta also demonstrates the power of platform models for generating innovation and securing user uptake. Harmonising different types of data from different sources is a key feature of the platform and this functionality was enabled by partnering with external firms.
The implications of Delta’s success for the sector could be more far reaching. Ukrainian digital startups have paved a new way for the sluggish European defence industry to reinvent itself, and sees growing investment. The model of ‘open innovation’ in the private sector, with different parties moving quickly and willing to co-operate due to a shared European vision has proved to be a formula for success. This vision is driving a network of new businesses in the continent, backed by domestic and foreign capital to apply existing technologies in new ways.
Government is also recognising the power of startup innovation and is providing backing in the form of investment, hackathons and incubators. Where militaries have absorbed innovative technologies, as in the case of Delta, there will be questions about how competitive advantage can be maintained within the confines of government bureaucracy.
This essay did not touch on AI, with current wartime applications relatively experimental and almost exclusively in supporting functions (Bondar, 2024b). As civilian AI tools improve, military applications will undoubtedly emerge, and this is an area currently seeing intense investment.
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